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We study the e¤ects of hospital merger in a spatial competition framework where semi-altruistic
hospitals choose quality and cost-containment e¤ort. Whereas a merger always leads to higher
average cost e¢ciency, the e¤ect on quality provision depends on the strategic nature of quality
competition, which in turn depends on the degree of altruism and the e¤ectiveness of
cost-containment e¤ort. If qualities are strategic complements, a merger leads to lower quality for
all hospitals. If qualities are strategic substitutes, a merger leads to higher quality for at least one
hospital and might also yield higher average quality provision and increased patient utility.
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I. Introduction
The hospital industry has undergone substantial consolidation during the last decades both in
the US and in Europe.1 The stated motives for hospital mergers are that they facilitate e¢ciency
gains and enhance the quality of care. However, there is a growing concern that the continuing
consolidation may increase market power in the hospital industry and thereby lead to adverse e¤ects
for patients through lower quality of care.2 Whereas in the past governments tended to encourage
consolidation and antitrust authorities approved most of the hospital mergers, there is recently a
clear tendency towards a more strict regulation of hospital mergers. In 2009 the UK government
established the Cooperation and Competition Panel (CCP) with the authority of approving NHS
hospital mergers. In January 2013 the O¢ce of Fair Trading (OFT) referred for the rst time a
merger of two NHS foundation trusts to the Competition Commission stating:3
"The evidence before the OFT is that the merger would combine two trusts that
compete closely for GP referrals for many specialties and it is likely that the merger
would result in few realistic alternative providers for patients and NHS commissioning
groups. As a result, the OFT could not dismiss concerns that in several medical spe-
cialties [...] the merger might reduce the hospitals incentives to continue to enhance
the quality of those services over the minimum required standards and would result in
less choice for commissioners wishing to reorganise services."
What do we know about the e¤ects of hospital mergers on quality and cost e¢ciency? Not much.
The empirical literature is very limited and the overall picture emanating from the few existing
studies is rather inconclusive. Furthermore, there is, to our knowledge, no comprehensive theoretical
analysis of merger e¤ects on quality and cost e¢ciency in hospital markets under price regulation.
Given the growing real-world importance of hospital mergers, this is clearly an important void in
the literature, since standard merger analyses cannot be directly applied to the case of hospital
mergers, because of institutional and behavioural idiosyncrasies.4
1A description of the consolidation and corresponding changes in concentration in the US and UK hospital markets
can be found in the recent survey by Gaynor and Town (2012).
2For example, the merger simulations by Beckert et al. (2012) with data from the English NHS show that
merging hospitals demand would become substantially less sensitive to quality after the merger. This would lessen
competition and might have adverse e¤ects on patients.
3See the OFT webpage: http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2013/01-13#.U1ZGkm-KBdg
4 In most OECD countries hospitals face regulated prices and compete only on quality. Furthermore, it is widely
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The aim of the present paper is to contribute towards lling this void. We ask the following
questions: How does a hospital merger a¤ect the merging hospitals incentives for quality and cost
containment? How do competing hospitals respond to the merger? Do the e¤ects of a merger
depend on whether or not the merger involves hospital closure? What are the e¤ects on consumer
welfare? Which type of hospital mergers should be approved?
In order to answer these questions, we use a spatial competition framework with three ex ante
identical hospitals symmetrically located on the Salop circle.5 Hospitals are semi-altruistic and
choose quality and cost-containment e¤ort to maximise a weighted sum of prots and patients
utility from treatment. Patients select hospital based on travelling distance and quality, and the
hospitals receive a regulated price for each patient treated.
In the benchmark model we focus on the anticompetitive e¤ects of hospital mergers by assuming
the merger implies coordination of supply (quality and cost-containment e¤ort) among the merging
hospitals. In addition, the merger is assumed to entail synergies in cost containment. In an
extension to the benchmark model we allow for another type of cost synergies by considering
closure of one of the merging hospitals, which implies savings of xed costs.
Our analysis applies to an institutional setting where hospitals compete for patients on quality,
but cannot set prices for their treatments. The case of regulated prices is relevant for most OECD
countries, as well as the US Medicare, where activity-based funding of the Diagnosis Related Groups
(DRG) type is the norm: each hospital receives a xed price for each patient treated. Since prices
are xed, the scope for hospitals to increase prices following a merger is therefore precluded. How
can mergers then damage patients? As highlighted above, the key concern is that a merger can
reduce quality of care and increase patients travelling costs. Within the health sector, quality
and choice remains possibly the key concern for health policymakers, which in turn is reected in
regulators mandates. Indeed, in the UK, according to the recent guidelines from the Competition
& Markets Authority (CMA), NHS mergers are likely to be investigated if there is a risk for adverse
e¤ects on patient choice and quality of care.6
We show that the e¤ect of a hospital merger on quality and patient utility depends crucially on
recognised in the health economics literature that the standard paradigm of prot maximisation does not necessarily
apply to health care providers, who tend to have somewhat broader objectives.
5A similar framework has been used by Gravelle (1999) and Nuscheler (2003) to study competition among
physicians, and Brekke et al. (2011) for competition among hospitals with regulated prices.
6See the report "CMA guidance on the review of NHS mergers", 31 July 2014.
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the strategic nature of quality competition: whether qualities are strategic substitutes or comple-
ments. If qualities are strategic complements, a merger will lead to lower quality at all hospitals in
the market, regardless of whether the merger implies hospital closure or not. On the other hand,
if qualities are strategic substitutes, at least one hospital will increase quality provision as a result
of the merger, which might be enough to increase not only average quality in the market, but also
total patient utility. In a merger with closure, quality increases at all remaining hospitals whenever
qualities are strategic substitutes. Even if closure implies a larger increase in total travelling costs,
patient utility will nevertheless increase either if hospitals are su¢ciently altruistic or if the scope
for cost containment is su¢ciently large.
The strategic nature of quality competition depends on two salient features of the hospital
sector: the degree of altruism and the interaction between quality and cost-containment incentives.
If there is no scope for cost containment, qualities are strategic complements (substitutes) if altruism
is su¢ciently low (high) relative to the cost substitutability between quality and output. However,
allowing for cost-containment e¤ort, the nature of the strategic relationship changes. With only
xed quality costs, qualities are now strategic substitutes for any degree of altruism including the
case of purely prot-maximising hospitals. If there are variable quality costs, quality decisions
are strategic substitutes if altruism is su¢ciently high or if cost-containment e¤ort is su¢ciently
e¤ective. Thus, cost-containment e¤ort is an additional factor that contributes to making qualities
strategic substitutes.
The e¤ect of a hospital merger on cost e¢ciency is more uniformly positive. Regardless of
the strategic nature of quality competition, a hospital merger (without closure) will always lead
to higher cost-containment e¤ort for at least one of the hospitals, and it might also increase cost
e¢ciency at all hospitals, partly because such a merger increases the e¢ciency of cost-containment
e¤ort for the merged hospitals. In any case, average cost containment in the market increases as a
result of the merger. The variable-cost merger synergy disappears if the merged entity closes down
one of its hospitals after the merger. Nevertheless, the remaining hospitals will choose a higher
level of cost-containment e¤ort because of higher demand, which directly stimulates incentives for
cost containment.
Our analysis o¤ers a rst coherent theoretical investigation of hospital mergers under price
regulation. The standard model on mergers with endogenous price cannot be straightforwardly
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applied to the hospital sector. Typically, prices are strategic complements and therefore a merger
triggers an increase in price by the non-merging rm. In our model we show that qualities can
be strategic substitutes when features specic to the hospital sector are introduced. A merger can
therefore trigger an increase in quality by the non-merging hospital if the merged hospitals lower
their quality. As a result, the welfare implications may not be as severe as when all providers reduce
quality.
The assumption that health care providers are motivated or exhibit altruistic concerns is by now
well recognised in the literatures of both health economics7 and public economics.8 We assume that
health care providers are semi-altruistic, meaning that they care, at least to some extent, about
the treatment benet of their patient. Although physicians may not act as perfect agents for the
patients, it seems plausible that they may act at least as imperfect ones (McGuire, 2000). The
empirical evidence also suggests that altruism and motivation are important components of health
care workers job and that job satisfaction depends on both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects
of employment.9
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we give a brief overview of
related literature and explain more precisely the contribution of our paper. In Section III we present
the basic model. In Section IV we derive the (symmetric) Nash equilibrium in the pre-merger game.
In Section V we derive the (asymmetric) Nash equilibrium in the post-merger game and analyse
the e¤ects of a hospital merger. In Section VI we analyse if and how our results might change if a
merger leads to closure of one of the merging hospitals. In Section VII we discuss implications for
competition policy. Finally, in Section VIII we summarise our ndings and o¤er some concluding
reections.
II. Relation to existing literature
Our paper relates to the fairly large theoretical literature on quality competition in health care
markets. This literature usually nds that if prices are regulated and providers are maximising
7See, e.g., Ellis and McGuire (1986), Chalkley and Malcomson (1998), Eggleston (2005). Heyes (2005), Jack
(2005), Choné and Ma (2011), Kaarbøe and Siciliani (2011).
8See, e.g., Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2006), Dixit (2005), Murdock (2002), Lakdawalla and Philipson, (2006),
Delfgaauw and Dur (2007, 2008), Glazer (2004), Makris (2009), Brekke et al. (2011, 2012), and Siciliani et al. (2013).
9See Page (1996), Le Grand (2003, chapter 2), Shields and Ward (2001), Antonazzo et al. (2003), Gregg et al.
(2008), Ikenwilo and Scott (2007), Leonard and Masatu (2010).
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prots, then more competition results in higher quality.10 However, with semi-altruistic hospitals,
some studies nd that more competition does not necessarily increase quality (see, e.g., Brekke et
al., 2011).11 We extend this literature by focusing on mergers rather than the number of hospitals
or the intensity of competition. Our study demonstrates that hospital mergers (without closure)
do not have the same e¤ects as reduced competition on market outcomes. In particular, we show
that a merger may give hospitals opposing incentives with respect to quality and cost-containment
e¤ort depending on whether or not they take part in the merger. Thus, the impact of mergers on
market outcome and social welfare is distinctly di¤erent from reducing the number of hospitals or
relaxing the intensity of competition between a given number of competing hospitals.
There exists a couple of theoretical studies on hospital mergers. Calem et al. (1999) model
quality (or quality-adjusted price) competition among hospitals and examine whether mergers en-
hance social welfare. In their model there is overutilisation of care due to insurance, and they nd
that mergers may be desirable since hospitals reduce quality, which in turn induces patients to con-
sume less care. However, Gaynor et al. (2000) show that reduced competition in medical markets
cannot have any e¢ciency-enhancing e¤ects even in the presence of moral hazard, because insurers
would respond to changes in the hospital market by altering the coinsurance rate. Another study is
Brekke (2004) who analyses the protability of mergers when hospitals negotiate wages with physi-
cian unions. Using a model with two hospitals that compete on quality and potentially also on
prices, he nds that the protability of a merger depends on the bargaining structure (centralised
or decentralised) and the nature of competition (non-price or price competition). Our paper di¤ers
from these studies along several dimensions. The most crucial di¤erence is that a merger in these
papers leads to a monopolisation of the hospital market. Thus, the nature of the merger is very
di¤erent, as an important feature of our merger analysis is how the non-merging hospitals respond
to the merger.
The study by Gal-Or (1999a) considers hospital (and payer) mergers that do not monopolise
the market.12 She uses a model with imperfect competition in both the insurance and the hospital
10See, e.g., Gravelle (1999), Lyon (1999), Beita (2003), Nuscheler (2003), Brekke et al. (2006, 2007), Karlsson
(2007) and Brekke et al. (2015).
11Our study is related to Brekke et al. (2011), but di¤ers in several important ways. First, we study mergers
rather than competition and show that the e¤ects on quality provision are distinctly di¤erent due to the asymmetric
responses by merging and non-merging hospitals. Second, we endogenise hospital costs and show that this may a¤ect
the nature of competition and thus the e¤ect of hospital mergers. Finally, we also analyse welfare e¤ects.
12See also Gal-Or (1999b) who study vertical mergers between hospitals and physician practices in a similar
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market, and focuses on the bargaining between insurers and hospitals on the reimbursement rates.13
In her model individuals choose insurer based on relative premiums and distance to the most
preferred insurer. However, the choice of hospital is only based on travel distance; i.e., there is
no direct competition between hospitals. The incentive for hospitals to merge is to increase their
bargaining power towards the insurers, but also to improve e¢ciency by closing down one hospital.
She nds that hospitals are more likely to merge without consolidating their capacities the less
competitive they are vis-à-vis the payers market.
The empirical literature on the e¤ects of hospital mergers on quality is very scant. The few
existing studies tend to nd no e¤ect or very small negative e¤ects. Ho and Hamilton (2000) nd
that mergers in California have no e¤ect on the quality of care as measured by mortality rates for
patients with heart attack and stroke, though readmission rates and early discharges for newborns
increased in some cases. Capps (2005) focuses on mergers in the New York state during 1995-2000
and also nd no e¤ects for most quality indicators. Romano and Balan (2011) focus on two mergers
in the Chicago suburbs and nd little evidence that the mergers led to any quality improvements.
Gaynor et al. (2012a) examine the impact of a large number of mergers in England, where prices
are regulated, on a range of outcomes including nancial performance, productivity, waiting times
and clinical quality. They nd little evidence that mergers had any e¤ect on clinical quality but
activity reduced and waiting times increased.
Empirical studies on the impact of hospital mergers on cost-e¢ciency are even more scarce.
Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) examine mergers of previously independent hospitals and nd that
these hospitals experience post-merger cost decreases of 14 percent on average. A recent study by
Harrison (2010) nds cost reductions immediately after the merger, but eventually costs rose to
pre-merger levels. Thus, the long-term e¤ects on cost-e¢ciency are less clear.
Although not directly related to mergers, our results on quality are in line with studies that nd
that reductions in competition, as measured by concentration indices, reduce quality for markets
with regulated prices. For the US Medicare market, Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Kessler and
Geppert (2005) nd that market concentration signicantly increases mortality. Recent studies on
the English National Health Service (NHS) reforms in 2006 introducing patient choice and regulated
bargaining set-up.
13See also Gowrinsankaran et al. (2013) who study bargaining between hospitals and managed care organizations.
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prices report similar ndings (see Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013). The e¤ects of hospital
concentration under price competition vary in all directions (see Gaynor and Town, 2012).
III. Model
Consider a market for health care services where three providers (hospitals), denoted by i =
1; 2; 3, are equidistantly located on a circle with circumference equal to 1.14 A total mass of 1
consumers (patients) are uniformly distributed on the same circle. Each patient demands one unit
of treatment from the most preferred provider. Patients are insured and hospital treatment is free
at the point of consumption. The net utility of a patient located at z and seeking treatment at
Hospital i, located at xi, is given by
uz;xi = v + bqi   t jz   xij ; (1)
where qi  0 is the quality o¤ered by Hospital i; b > 0 is the marginal utility of quality; and t > 0
is the marginal disutility of travelling.15 In order to ensure full market coverage for any qi  0 in
all games considered, we assume v > t=3.
Each patient chooses the preferred hospital based on quality and travelling costs. The location
(measured clockwise from Hospital i) of the patient who is indi¤erent between Hospital i and





b (qi   qi+1)
2t
; (2)
whereas the location (measured anticlockwise from Hospital i) of the patient who is indi¤erent





b (qi   qi 1)
2t
: (3)
When each patient makes a utility-maximising choice, the demand for Hospital i is therefore a
14The assumption of three instead of n hospitals is made in order to make the analysis tractable. In a market
with n hospitals the incentives for a non-merging hospital to provide quality in the post-merger game would depend
on its relative positioning in space vis-à-vis the merged hospitals. However, as competition is localised, the strongest
responses to a merger will always come from the merged hospitals closest neighbours. Therefore, the assumption of
three hospitals is without too much loss of generality.
15Empirical studies conrm that higher quality and shorter travelling distance increase the probability of choosing
a health care provider. See, e.g., Folland (1983), Luft et al. (1990), Burns and Wholey (1992), Hodgkin (1996), Tay
(2003), Howard (2005), Sivey (2012), Beckert et al (2012) and Gaynor et al. (2012b).
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function of its own quality and the qualities of its two neighbours, and given by















The hospitals are assumed to be ex ante identical (apart from their location). The cost function
of Hospital i is given by
Ci (qi; Di) = (i + cqi)Di +
k
2
q2i + F; (5)
where i > 0, k > 0, F > 0, and c  0. If c = 0, quality provision involves only xed costs and
quality is a public good at hospital level. If c > 0, quality provision involves both variable and xed
costs, and quality and treatment volume are cost substitutes (@2Ci=@qi@Di > 0). This assumption
implies constant marginal cost of treatment, but where the cost per patient is increasing in the
quality provided.
Each hospital can reduce its treatment costs by expending e¤ort on cost containment. More
specically, we assume i :=    "i, where "i is the amount of cost-containment e¤ort chosen by
Hospital i. Thus, by expending e¤ort in the amount of "i, total treatment costs will be reduced by
an amount "iDi. The disutility of cost containment e¤ort is assumed to be strictly convex in the
amount of e¤ort expended: w2 "
2
i , where w > 0.
Finally, hospitals are semi-altruistic in the sense that they, to some extent, take the medically
relevant part of patient utility directly into account when making their decisions. More specically,
we assume that Hospital i ignores the travelling costs of their patients but attaches a weight  > 0
to the remaining part of their total utility, (v + bqi)Di. Under these assumptions, the objective
function of Hospital i can be written as








where p := bp    + v, with bp being the xed price that the hospital receives (from a third-party
payer) per treatment,  := c b, and P := T  F , with T being a lump-sum transfer (block grant)
from the regulator. The regulatory instruments (bp and P ) are assumed to be such that the each
hospital has a non-negative payo¤. However, we perform the analysis within a static regulatory
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environment where any potential cost savings are captured by the hospitals.16
We make the following restrictions on parameter values throughout the analysis:
w > w :=
2b2
t (3b + kt)
;  >  :=  
kt
3b




 (2 + b)




 + 2b+ wt2k

3bw ( + b+ wt2k)
)
; p :=
(b + 2kt) (2 + b)
3b2ktw
: (8)
Parameters  and  are dened as  := tw (2b + kt) b2 > 0 and  := tw b 7 0:These restrictions
ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium with interior solutions in all games considered.
IV. Nash equilibrium in the pre-merger game




= (p+ "i   qi)
@Di
@qi
  Di   kqi = 0; (9)
where @Di=@qi = b=t. The rst term measures the marginal benet of higher demand for a given
quality level. A marginal quality increase attracts more patients to Hospital i and, for a given
quality level, each of these patients has a value p + "i   qi for the hospital. However, higher
quality also increases both the marginal cost (cqi) and the altruistic gain (bqi) of treatment. The
net e¤ect is given by the second term in (9), which adds to (subtracts from) the benet of higher
quality if the degree of altruism is su¢ciently high (low). Quality is optimally provided when the
sum of these two terms is equal to the marginal cost of quality investments, which is given by the
third term in (9).




= Di   w"i = 0; (10)
and shows that the optimal e¤ort is proportional to demand. This is entirely intuitive, since a
higher treatment volume increases the incentives for reducing marginal treatment costs.
16See Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (2015) for an analysis of hospitals incentives for quality and cost containment
when surpluses (decits) might be conscated (covered) by the regulator.
17Second-order conditions are given in the Appendix.
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The e¤ects of a hospital merger on quality provision depend crucially on the nature of strategic
interaction between the hospitals. It is instructive to characterise this in detail. From (9), the
best-quality-response function of Hospital i, for a given level of cost containment, is given by










3 (2b + kt)
: (11)
We see that cost-containment e¤ort and quality provision are complementary strategies for each
hospital. This relationship is fairly straightforward. More cost containment increases the prot
margin and therefore makes it more protable to provide a higher level of quality. The cost-
containment e¤ort chosen by competing hospitals has no direct inuence on quality provision (i.e.,
@qi=@"j = 0).
The strategic relationship between quality provision at competing hospitals is less straightfor-





2 (2b + kt)




For a given level of cost containment, the strategic nature of quality competition is determined by
two di¤erent factors: (i) the degree of cost substitutability between quality and treatment volume,
and (ii) the degree of altruism. If treatment costs do not depend on quality, and if there is no
altruism, the hospitals quality choices are strategically independent.
Cost substitutability between quality and output contributes to making qualities strategic com-
plements (i.e., @qi=@qj > 0). If a hospital increases its quality, the competing hospitals lose de-
mand, which in turn reduces their marginal cost of quality and increases their incentives for quality
provision. On the other hand, altruism contributes to making qualities strategic substitutes (i.e.,
@qi=@qj < 0). Since the marginal altruistic gain from increasing quality provision depends positively
on the number of patients treated, the demand loss caused by a quality increase by a competing hos-
pital will therefore reduce the incentives to supply quality for altruistic reasons. Thus, for a given
level of cost containment, whether qualities are strategic substitutes or complements depends on
the degree of altruism relative to the degree of cost substitutability between quality and treatment
volume.
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If we allow each hospital to optimally adjust their choices of cost-containment e¤ort in response
to quality changes, by setting













































If qualities are strategic substitutes for a given level of cost-containment e¤ort (i.e.,  < 0), allowing
this e¤ort to be optimally adjusted does not change the strategic nature of quality competition,
since  < 0 implies  < 0. However, if  > 0, optimal e¤ort adjustments make qualities strategic
substitutes if such e¤ort is su¢ciently e¤ective in reducing treatment costs (w < b=t). Thus,
endogenous cost-containment e¤ort is an additional factor that contributes towards making qualities
strategic substitutes. The reason is that the incentive for cost containment depends positively on
treatment volume. If a hospital increases quality provision, competing hospitals lose demand, which
dampens the incentives of these hospitals to contain treatment costs. Less cost containment implies
a lower prot margin which, in turn, reduces incentives for quality provision. Thus, the nature of
strategic interaction between competing hospitals is determined by the sum of three di¤erent e¤ects
and is summarised as follows:18
Lemma 1 When cost-containment e¤ort is optimally adjusted, qualities are (i) strategic substitutes
if altruism is su¢ciently high compared to the marginal treatment cost of quality, ie  > c=b; or if
the marginal disutility of e¤ort is su¢ciently low, w < b= (t (c  b)), (ii) strategically independent
if  = (ctw   b) =btw, and (iii) strategic complements otherwise.
18 In the Appendix we show that, in qualitative terms, the results in Lemma 1 are fairly general and do not strictly
depend on the specic demand structure derived from the Salop model.
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Solving the system of rst-order conditions given by (9)-(10), quality and e¤ort in the symmetric









Consider a merger between two of the hospitals.19 We assume that such a merger does not
lead to any hospital closures, either because a closure would not be approved by the regulator or
because the potential xed-cost synergies are too small.
A merger allows the two merger participants to reduce competition between them by coordi-
nating their quality choices. In addition, we assume that a merger allows for e¢ciency gains by
letting a given cost-containment e¤ort apply to both of the merged hospitals. Thus, if Hospital
i and Hospital j merge, the merged entity chooses qi, qj and "m to maximise joint payo¤, where
"m is the amount of cost-containment e¤ort chosen by the management of the new merged entity
and which reduces marginal treatment costs at both of the merged hospitals.20 The maximisation




























  Di   kqi = 0; (18)




= Di +Dj   w"m = 0: (19)
19A model with more than three hospitals would allow mergers also between non-neighboring hospitals. Without
any cost synergies, such mergers would not change the equilibrium since competition is localised. Allowing for cost
synergies would lead to lower marginal treatment costs and therefore higher quality for the merging hospitals.
20Since there is no direct strategic interaction between hospitals in the choice of cost-containment e¤ort, such
merger synergies have the same (qualitative) e¤ects as any other type of synergy that leads to lower marginal
treatment costs. For example, if hospitals have di¤erent marginal costs, a merger between a low-cost and a high-cost
hospital would entail a similar type of e¢ciency gain if the merged entity can operate at the e¢ciency level of the
low-cost hospital.
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Compared with (9), we see that (18) has an additional negative term, (p+ "i   qi) (@Dj=@qi) <
0, which reects the fact that the merger allows the hospitals to internalise a negative competition
externality, which, all else equal, implies lower quality provision by the merged hospitals.21 On
the other hand, a merger increases incentives for cost containment (for given quality levels), as is
evident from a comparison of (16) and (19). Higher cost-containment e¤ort leads to lower treatment
costs, which in turn stimulates incentives for quality provision. Thus, whether the merger leads to
higher or lower quality provision by the merged hospitals is a priori uncertain.
The maximisation problem of the outside hospital is identical to the one in the pre-merger game
and the rst-order conditions for optimal quality and cost-containment e¤ort are therefore given
by (9). Let Dm denote total demand of the merged hospital. In the post-merger Nash equilibrium,
quality and cost-containment by merged and non-merged hospitals, denoted (qm; "m) and (qo; "o),
respectively, are then given by
qm =
































and  := tw
 
3b (b + 2kt) + 2k2t2

  b2 (2b + 3kt) > 0:
In the remainder of this section we will explore how a merger a¤ects quality provision and
cost e¢ciency of all the hospitals in the market, how the patients are a¤ected, and, nally, what
determines the hospitals incentives to merge.
Quality and cost e¢ciency
The e¤ect of a hospital merger on quality provision can be stated as follows:22
21This is the mechanism highlighted by Katz (2014) in his brief discussion of hospital merger (from duopoly to
monopoly).
22All proofs are in Appendix, which includes an exact characterisation of all the parameter thresholds that are
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Proposition 1 (i) If qualities are strategic complements, a hospital merger leads to lower quality





, such that a hospital merger leads to lower (higher) quality for the merged hospitals and
higher (lower) quality for the non-merged hospital if the regulated price is su¢ciently high (low),
such that p > (<) pq.
As previously explained, a merger has two counteracting e¤ects on the merged hospitals in-
centives for quality provision. On the one hand, a merger allows the participants to internalise a
negative competition externality by reducing their quality provision. On the other hand, the e¢-
ciency gain of the merger implies lower treatment costs, which in turn stimulates quality provision.
The former (latter) e¤ect dominates if the price (bp) is su¢ciently high (low), such that p > (<) pq,
which implies that quality competition is relatively strong (weak) in the pre-merger game, and
where p < pq is possible only if qualities are strategic substitutes.
The response of the outside hospital depends entirely on the strategic nature of quality competi-
tion. If qualities are strategic complements, a hospital merger leads to lower quality for all hospitals
in the industry. On the other hand, if qualities are strategic substitutes, the quality e¤ects of a
merger are heterogenous, with higher quality for at least one hospital in the industry. Quality will
increase either for the merged hospitals because of su¢ciently strong e¢ciency gains (if p < pq) or
for the non-merged hospital because of strategic substitutability (if p > pq).
The e¤ects of a hospital merger on cost e¢ciency are given as follows:








, such that a
hospital merger leads to (i) higher (lower) cost-containment e¤ort for the merging hospitals if the
regulated price is su¢ciently low (high), such that p < (>) p"; (ii) higher (lower) cost-containment
e¤ort for the non-merged hospital if the quality of the merging hospitals goes down (up); and (iii)
higher average cost containment in the market.
For the merged hospital, incentives for cost-containment e¤ort are decided by two di¤erent
factors. First, the merger in itself increases the e¤ectiveness of cost-containment e¤ort and therefore
leads to higher e¤ort, all else equal. If the merged hospital also increases its quality provision, this
reported in the remaining Propositions of the paper.
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e¤ect will be reinforced by higher demand, which increases incentives for cost containment. On the
other hand, if the merged hospitals quality provision goes down, the direct positive e¤ect of the
merger on cost containment will be counteracted by reduced demand, which, all else equal, reduces
the incentive to spend e¤ort on containing treatment costs. The overall e¤ect depends on both
the direction and relative strength of these two e¤ects. If the price is su¢ciently high, such that
p > p", the decrease in quality provision (and thus treatment volume) by the merged hospital is
su¢ciently strong to outweigh the direct e¤ect, implying that a merger makes the merged hospitals
less cost-e¢cient. On the other hand, if the price is su¢ciently low, such that p < pq < p", a merger
will increase both quality and cost-e¢ciency of the merged hospitals.
For the non-merged hospital, the e¤ect of the merger on cost e¢ciency depends entirely on
how the merger a¤ects equilibrium demand for this hospital. If the merger leads to lower (higher)
quality by the merged hospital, the outside hospital will have higher (lower) demand in equilibrium
and therefore spend more (less) e¤ort on cost containment. A merger might increase cost e¢ciency
for all hospitals in the market, and, in any case, the increase in cost containment for at least one
of the hospitals is always su¢cient to ensure that average cost containment in the market increases
as a result of the merger.
Average quality and patient utility
A hospital merger a¤ects patients in two ways. First, patients will generally experience a change
in quality provision by merging and non-merging hospitals. Second, a merger implies a change from
a symmetric to an asymmetric equilibrium, which implies an increase in total travelling costs.
Regarding quality provision, perhaps the most interesting corollary of Proposition 1 is that,
if qualities are strategic substitutes, a hospital merger has heterogenous e¤ects on patients: some
patients benet from higher quality while others su¤er from lower quality. The e¤ect of the merger
on average quality, measured as the sum of qualities weighted by market shares, is given as follows:
Proposition 3 A hospital merger increases average quality if qualities are strategic substitutes and
one of the following two conditions is satised: (i) the regulated price is su¢ciently low, such that
p < pq, or (ii) the regulated price is su¢ciently high, such that p > pq, where pq 2 (pq; p) if  < 0.
Otherwise, average quality goes down as a result of the merger.
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A necessary condition for a merger to increase average quality is that qualities are strategic
substitutes, which implies that one of the hospitals will increase quality after the merger. If the
merged hospitals increase quality (which happens if p < pq), more than two thirds of patients
experience higher quality as a result of the merger, which is enough to ensure that average quality
goes up. On the other hand, if the non-merged hospital increases quality (which happens if p >
pq), the post-merger market share of the non-merged hospital must be su¢ciently large to ensure
that average quality increases. This requires that the post-merger quality di¤erence between the
hospitals is su¢ciently large, which in turn requires that the price is su¢ciently high. If p is above
a threshold level pq (which is higher than pq), the post-merger market share of the non-merged
hospital is su¢ciently large to ensure that average quality in the market is higher after the merger.
It can easily be shown that the threshold value pq is monotonically increasing in w. When
cost-containment is more e¤ective (lower w), the demand increase following the merger will be
accompanied by a larger increase in cost-containment e¤ort by the non-merged hospital, which in
turn increases the hospitals incentive to provide higher quality. In other words, given that qualities
are strategic substitutes, a lower w implies that the non-merged hospital responds more strongly to
a quality reduction by the merged hospital, as can easily be conrmed from (15), thereby increasing
the likelihood that average quality will increase as a result of the merger.
Even if a hospital merger increases average quality, total patient utility might nevertheless
decrease when travelling costs are taken into account, because of higher average travelling costs in
the (asymmetric) post-merger equilibrium.23 Suppose that a merger leads to lower quality at the
merged hospital and higher quality at the outside hospital. Some patients will then switch from the
merged to the non-merged hospital and therefore obtain a higher quality of treatment than before
the merger. However, these patients switch to the non-merged hospital not only because quality
has increased at this hospital, but also because quality has dropped at the merged hospital. Thus,
some of these patients might nevertheless su¤er a reduction in utility, if their increase in travelling
costs outweigh the increase in the quality they are o¤ered.
23The total welfare e¤ect of a hospital merger, which also takes the costs of quality provision into account, depends
crucially on the regulated price level (bp). Lower (higher) average quality provision implies, all else equal, a welfare
loss if quality is underprovided (overprovided), which will be the case if the price is su¢ciently low (high).
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Comparing total patient utility, summed over all hospitals, before and after the merger, we obtain
the following result:
Proposition 4 A hospital merger increases total patient utility if qualities are strategic substitutes
and if one of the following conditions is satised: (i) the regulated price is su¢ciently low, such
that p < pq, or (ii) the regulated price is su¢ciently high, such that p > pu 2 (pq; p), and either
the marginal disutility of e¤ort w or the net marginal treatment cost of quality  is su¢ciently low.
Otherwise, total patient utility goes down as a result of the merger.
Qualities being strategic substitutes is a necessary condition for a merger to benet patients
since, otherwise, a merger leads to both lower quality and higher travelling costs. If, in addition,
the merger leads to higher quality for the merged hospital (which happens if p < pq), the increase
in average quality is always large enough to outweigh the increase in total travelling costs. In this
case, more than two thirds of the patients benet from higher quality.
On the other hand, if the merger leads to higher quality for the outside hospital, an increase in
average quality is not su¢cient to increase total patient utility. In this case, the increase in average
quality must be su¢ciently high, which requires a su¢ciently high quality increase by the outside
hospital. The increase in average quality is large enough to increase total patient utility if the price
is su¢ciently high and either  or w are su¢ciently low. From (15) it can easily be conrmed that
a lower value of either  or w increases the magnitude of the outside hospitals quality response
to the merger. Notice also that the threshold values of  and w (see the explicit values in the
Appendix) decrease in t. Thus, the scope for a hospital merger to increase total patient utility
increases when travelling is cheaper.
Finally, when considering the e¤ects of a hospital merger on average quality and total patient
utility, it is worth mentioning the importance of two of our key assumptions: semi-altruistic hospital
objectives and endogenous cost e¢ciency. A necessary condition for a hospital merger to benet
patients is that qualities are strategic substitutes. This requires either that hospitals are su¢ciently
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altruistic or that the scope for cost containment is su¢ciently large. Notice, however, that only one
of these assumptions is needed to obtain qualitatively the same results as in Proposition 3 and 4.
Thus, a merger between purely prot-oriented hospitals can increase both average quality and total
patient utility if the scope for cost containment is su¢ciently large. And even if cost containment is
not possible, a hospital merger can have the same e¤ects if the hospitals are su¢ciently altruistic.
The latter case also implies that the presence of cost synergies is not a necessary condition for a
hospital merger to benet patients.
Merger incentives
In the above analysis we have implicitly assumed that the hospitals actually have incentives to
merge. It might be useful, though, to examine more closely what determines the hospitals incen-
tives to merge. By assumption, the hospitals have wider objectives than pure prot-maximisation,
and the payo¤ functions of the hospitals include both monetary and non-monetary costs. If we
assume that hospital merger decisions are made by the same decision makers who decide on cost-
containment e¤ort and quality provision, it would be reasonable to assume that the set of proposed
mergers will be restricted to those that increase the joint payo¤ of the merger participants, poten-
tially also with the additional constraint that such mergers are nancially protable.
Although the complexity of the equilibrium payo¤ expressions makes it infeasible to give a
precise analytical characterisation of the set of payo¤-increasing mergers, we can nevertheless give
some general indications of what it takes for a merger to increase joint payo¤s. As discussed in
the previous subsection, a merger has two direct e¤ects for the merger participants: it allows the
merged hospitals (i) to internalise a negative competition externality in quality provision, and (ii)
to realise an e¢ciency gain in cost containment. If qualities are strategic complements, it must be
the case that a merger increases joint payo¤s for the merger participants, since the response of the
non-merged hospital (lower quality) increases the demand for the merged hospital.
The only way the incentives for a hospital merger can potentially be eliminated is if the following
three conditions are met: (i) qualities are strategic substitutes, (ii) the merger leads to lower
quality by the merger participants, and (iii) the response from the outside hospital is su¢ciently
strong. From Lemma 1 we know that strategic substitutability requires either that the degree
of altruism is su¢ciently strong or that the scope for cost containment is su¢ciently high. It is
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possible to show analytically that the rst source of strategic substitutability alone is not enough
to eliminate merger incentives, since a merger always increases joint payo¤ if cost containment is
not possible.24 However, notice that the absence of cost-containment e¤ort also implies that there
is no e¢ciency gain from the merger. Thus, increased scope for cost containment might increase
rather than reduce merger incentives, even when qualities are strategic substitutes. Although a
complete analytical characterisation is not feasible, it is possible to conrm (by numerical examples)
that payo¤-increasing mergers exist within all the parameter sets that dene the di¤erent cases
considered throughout our analysis.
VI. Extension: hospital closure
In this section we examine if and how our previous analysis depends on the assumption that a
merger does not lead to hospital closure. Suppose that the merging hospitals decide to close down
one of its two hospitals and allocate all production to the remaining hospital. This is protable
if the xed-cost F is su¢ciently large. A merger now implies that the market structure changes
from a symmetric triopoly to a symmetric duopoly.25 The rst-order condition for optimal quality
and cost-containment e¤ort are given by (9) in the pre- and the post-merger games, the only
di¤erence being that demand for each hospital is given by (4) in the pre-merger game, whereas in
the post-merger game the demand function for Hospital i is given by
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The symmetric Nash-equilibrium outcome (in terms of quality and e¤ort) of the post-merger game
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The e¤ects of the merger on equilibrium quality and e¤ort are reasonably clear-cut:
Proposition 5 Hospital closure leads to higher cost-containment e¤ort and higher (lower) quality
for all remaining hospitals if qualities are strategic substitutes (complements).
24Details available upon request.
25With only two hospitals in the market, the equilibrium outcome in a Salop model will be symmetric regardless
of how the rms are located.
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Because of the symmetric nature of the post-merger game, the e¤ects of the merger are similar
for all hospitals in the market. The e¤ect on cost containment is directly related to the fact that
a hospital closure increases demand for the remaining hospitals in the market, which increases the
hospitals incentives to expend e¤ort to reduce treatment costs.
The e¤ect on the incentives for quality provision is slightly more involved. In the absence of
altruism and cost-containment e¤ort, higher demand increases the marginal cost of quality provision
and each hospital will consequently choose a lower level of quality. However, this can be overturned
either by a su¢ciently high degree of altruism or a su¢ciently strong scope for cost containment.
Higher demand increases the marginal altruistic gain of quality investments, which  all else equal
 leads to higher quality provision. More cost-containment e¤ort increases the prot margin on
each treatment and therefore also increases the incentive for quality provision in order to attract
more patients. If either of these two mechanisms are su¢ciently strong, a hospital merger leads to
higher quality provision. Notice that the threshold levels for these two e¤ects to yield higher or
lower equilibrium quality as a result of the merger, correspond exactly to the threshold levels for
qualities being strategic substitutes or complements.
Whether a hospital closure is benecial for the patients is crucially determined by the nature
of the strategic interaction between the hospitals. If qualities are strategic complements, hospital
closure is unambiguously detrimental to patients since quality provision drops and travelling costs
increase. On the other hand, if qualities are strategic substitutes, the increase in quality provision
might be su¢cient to outweigh the increase in travelling costs. With two hospitals in the market,







((4v + b (3qi + qj)) (qi   qj) + t (qi + qj)) : (27)
Proposition 6 Hospital closure is always harmful to total patient utility if qualities are strategic
complements. However, if qualities are strategic substitutes, then hospital closure increases total
patient utility if either the degree of altruism () is su¢ciently large or the marginal disutility of
cost-containment e¤ort (w) is su¢ciently low.
Hospital closure is benecial for patients if hospitals are su¢ciently altruistic, or if the scope
for cost containment is su¢ciently large. In either case, qualities are strategic substitutes for the
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hospitals. Notice that the threshold values of  and w are decreasing in t, implying a larger scope
for hospital closure to benet patients when travelling costs are lower. The reason is twofold: First,
a lower t implies that quality competition is more intense, because demand responds more strongly
to quality changes, which in turn implies that the quality increase following hospital closure is
larger (when qualities are strategic substitutes). Second, a lower t implies that the increase in total
travelling costs when one hospital closes down is lower, which in turn makes it more likely that the
quality increase is su¢ciently high to compensate for the increase in travelling costs.
The incentives for the merged entity to close down one of the merging hospitals depend on the
xed-cost saving (F ) that can be realised through closure. However, since the decision to close down
a hospital also has implications for the e¤ect of the merger on patient utility, the regulator might
not allow this to happen. By comparing Propositions 4 and 6 we can characterise the conditions
for which imposing a no-closure requirement should be used as a merger remedy by the regulator.
Suppose that qualities are strategic substitutes ( < 0). Then, if the regulated price is su¢ciently
low, such that p < pq, and if both  and w are su¢ciently high, a hospital merger will increase
total patient utility only if both of the merging hospitals continue to operate after the merger. The
reason is that a merger will lead to higher quality at the merging hospital because of relatively
strong synergies in cost containment, an e¤ect that disappears if one of the merging hospitals is
closed down. In this case, using a no-closure requirement as a merger remedy would ensure that
the benets of a hospital merger are also transmitted to the patients. However, notice also that,
for p > pq, the scope for a hospital merger to increase patient utility is, perhaps paradoxically,
larger if one of the merging hospitals is closed down. The reason is simply that hospital closure
implies a quality increase across all remaining hospitals, which, for su¢ciently low  or w, more
than compensates for the increase in travelling costs.
VII. Implications for competition policy
What are the implications for competition policy regarding hospital mergers? Clearly, the
competitive e¤ects of mergers depend on market characteristics, which should be accounted for
by competition authorities. In this paper, we have highlighted that hospital markets are di¤erent
in that (i) hospital objectives include not just prots but also patients benet from treatment;
(ii) prices for hospital services are regulated and cannot be set by the individual hospital; and
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(iii) quality is the key strategic variable for hospitals for attracting patients and thus increasing
revenues. These features imply that hospital mergers, in contrast to most other mergers, involve
no price e¤ects, and that the exploitation of market power may be constrained by altruism.
The key policy concern with hospital mergers is the possible adverse e¤ects on quality due to
the reduction of competition and patient choice. This is illustrated by the recent OFT review of a
merger between two NHS foundation trusts in the UK: "...it is likely that the merger would result
in few realistic alternative providers for patients and NHS commissioning groups. As a result, ...the
merger might reduce the hospitals incentives to continue to enhance the quality of those services
over the minimum required standards and would result in less choice...".26 Our results show that
this concern is valid, but not always. We show that the e¤ects of hospital mergers crucially depend
on the nature of quality competition. More precisely, if qualities are strategic complements, hospital
mergers are always harmful to patient utility, as the merger reduces quality and increases travel
costs. However, if qualities are strategic substitutes, hospital mergers may improve patient utility
if the increase in (average) quality is su¢ciently large relative to the increase in travel costs. Notice
that these results are qualitatively the same for mergers that involve closure of one of the merging
hospitals.
Competition authorities in most countries use a consumer welfare standard as the key bench-
mark in their merger control (Motta, 2004). A merger that is not expected to improve consumer
welfare will not be approved, even though there are e¢ciency gains. This implies that only mergers
with e¢ciency gains so large that prices drop after the merger will be approved. Thus, the merger
control requires that the gains from the merger should be shared with consumers. We allow for
e¢ciency gains from a hospital merger, where these gains are shared with consumers in terms of
higher quality (rather than lower prices). Applying a consumer welfare standard, the implications
for competition policy from our analysis can be summarised as follows.
Corollary 1 Hospital mergers should not be allowed if qualities are strategic complements, i.e.,
when the degree of altruism or the scope for cost-containment is su¢ciently low. If qualities are
strategic substitutes, hospital mergers should be evaluated case-by-case, and approved only if either
the degree of altruism or the scope for cost-containment is su¢ciently high.
26See the OFT webpage: http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2013/01-13#.U1ZGkm-KBdg
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VIII. Concluding remarks
Our analysis provides a coherent framework for regulators and policymakers to investigate the
e¤ect of mergers in the hospital sector. We have used a spatial competition framework and assumed
that hospitals face regulated prices and are semi-altruistic, and where a merger may or may not
involve closure of one of the merging hospitals. A merger without closure implies variable-cost
synergies in cost containment, whereas a merger with closure implies xed-cost synergies.
Overall, our analysis suggests that a hospital merger is more likely to improve cost e¢ciency
than to stimulate quality provision. Although incentives for cost containment might be lower for
one of the hospitals after the merger, a hospital merger leads, on average, to increased cost e¢ciency
in the hospital market. With hospital closure, the increase in cost e¢ciency is uniform across the
remaining hospitals.
The e¤ect of the merger on quality provision, on the other hand, depends crucially on the
strategic nature of quality competition. Unless hospitals are su¢ciently altruistic, or the scope
for cost containment is su¢ciently large, a merger will lead to lower quality for all hospitals in the
market. Regardless of whether a merger involves hospital closure or not, a necessary condition for a
merger to increase average quality provision is that qualities are strategic substitutes, which requires
either that the hospitals are su¢ciently altruistic, or that cost-containment e¤ort is su¢ciently
e¤ective. If the merger leads to hospital closure, this condition is also su¢cient, whereas in the
case of no closure, average quality increases only for a subset of the parameter values. A higher
average quality provision is a necessary, but not su¢cient, condition for increased patient utility,
since a merger also implies an increase in average travelling costs.
Our work highlights the importance of knowing, from a regulatory perspective, if hospitals
qualities are strategic substitutes, complements or independent. A natural framework to test for
this empirically is a spatial econometrics one, where a hospitals quality is regressed against the
quality of their rivals. We are aware of only one paper in the literature which test for hospital
strategic interaction. Gravelle, Santos and Siciliani (2014) employ a sample of English hospitals
in 200910 and a set of 16 quality measures including mortality rates, readmission, revision and
redo rates, and three patient reported indicators. They nd that a hospitals quality is positively
associated with the quality of its rivals for seven out of the sixteen quality measures. There are
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no statistically signicant negative associations. In those cases where there is a signicant positive
association, an increase in rivals quality by 10% increases a hospitals quality by 1.7% to 2.9%.
The nding suggests that qualities are either strategically independent or mildly complements.
Within our model, the results are consistent with the assumption of costs being increasing in
quality (which generates strategic complementarity) being weakly stronger than the one due to
altruism and cost containment (which generates strategic substitution). The empirical study does
not control for cost-containment e¤ort. Future work may be able to tell whether the possible
strategic complementarity in quality is a¤ected after controlling explicitly for e¤ort. It may also
be of interest to test for strategic substitution or complementarity in cost containment e¤ort, and
to test for the robustness of the existing nding in di¤erent institutional contexts and countries.
Besides the strategic nature of quality competition, our analysis also shows that the e¤ects of a
merger  on quality, cost e¢ciency and patient utility  depend crucially on the magnitude of the
regulated price that hospitals receive per treatment. This might indicate a potential role for price
adjustments as a merger remedy. In a second-best scenario, where the price is set to maximise
social welfare, it is clearly true that the optimal price would depend on the market structure and
that the welfare e¤ects of a merger could therefore be improved by a post-merger adjustment of the
price. In practice though, this seems to be a rather unrealistic scenario. Merger policy and industry
price regulation are conducted by di¤erent government bodies (competition authorities and, in our
case, health authorities) and hospital prices are usually set according to some cost-based pricing
rule. For these reasons, we have chosen not explore the e¤ects of hospital mergers under optimal
price regulation in the present paper.
Finally, we should point out that hospital mergers in practice may also involve other types
of variable-cost synergies (apart from cost reductions related to cost-containment e¤ort). All else
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All conditions are satised for  >  and w > w.
Quality competition with general demand functions
Let Di () be a general demand function for Hospital i with standard properties. The strategic
relationship w.r.t. quality when e¤ort is optimally adjusted can be derived from (9) in Section IV,





























The rst term represents the e¤ect on quality competition via e¤ort choices and is negative. Thus,
cost-containment e¤ort contributes towards making qualities strategic substitutes. The second term
represents the e¤ect via changes in the prot margin and the sign of this term depends on the sign of
. It is positive (negative) if  is su¢ciently small (large). Thus, altruism also contributes towards
making qualities strategic substitutes. The sign of the third term is ambiguous and depends on the
sign of @2Di=@qj@qi (which is zero in the Salop model).
Proof of Proposition 1
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We see that qm > (<) q
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Since the numerator in (A6) is monotonically increasing in w, and since limw!w (p  pq) > 0, it fol-
lows that pq < p for the entire parameter space that guarantees equilibrium existence. Furthermore,
we have
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only if  < 0, which implies that qm > q

i (which requires p < pq) is possible
only if  < 0. From (A5) we have that qo < q

i if p < pq (which implies  < 0). For p > pq, then
qo > (<) q

i if  < (>) 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
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Using the fact thatDo = 1 D
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m, the expression in (A10) can be written as (2=3w)
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which is positive for all Dm 2 (0; 1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
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i , the e¤ect of a hospital merger on average
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The sign of q depends on the sign of the numerator, where (3kptw + ) > (<) 0 if p > (<) pq.
The expression in the square brackets is monotonically increasing in p and is positive (negative) if
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where
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< 0 if  < 0; (A13)
and
pq   p =

bkt2w2 (b + kt)
< 0 if  < 0: (A14)
Thus, q > 0 either if p < pq (which implies  < 0) or if p > pq, which is possible only if  < 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
With three hospitals in the market, the total utility of patients attending Hospital i is given by
(24). Inserting the equilibrium quality values in the pre- and post-merger equilibria and summing
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The sign of B depends on the sign of the numerator, where (3kptw + ) > (<) 0 if p > (<) pq.
The expression in the square brackets is monotonically increasing in p and is positive (negative) if
p > (<) pu :=
6b4 (2b + 3kt)  tw
0
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B > 0 if either p < pq (which implies  < 0) or p > pu, which is only possible if pu < p, which
requires either  <  kt=4b or w < 3b2=t (4b + kt). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
A comparison of (16) and (26) yields qm   q





i = 1=6w > 0,
where qm > (<) q

i if  < (>) 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
The change in total patient utility when the number of hospitals in a symmetric Nash equilibrium
reduces from three to two is given by
B =
b2
6w (b + kt)
 
t (4b + kt)
18 (b + kt)
; (A18)
which is always positive if  <  kt=4b. For  >  kt=4b, the second term is negative and B > 0
if the rst term is su¢ciently large, which requires w < 3b2=t (4b + kt). Q.E.D.
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